Standards concerned with the development of safety-critical systems, and the software in such systems in particular, abound today as the software crisis increasingly a ects the world of embedded computer-based systems. The use of formal methods is often advocated as a way o f increasing con dence in such systems. This paper examines the industrial use of these techniques, the recommendations concerning formal methods in a number of current and draft standards, and comments on the applicability and problems of using formal methods for the development o f safety-critical systems of an industrial scale. Some possible future directions are suggested. 
space program demanded low-weight and high-reliability components { almost irrespective o f c o s t { for the (safety-critical) computer required on board the space craft. This enabled the US to gain the lead in the microelectronics world at the time subsequently the price of integrated circuits dropped and the number of transistors per chip increased dramatically year by y ear. Similar advances were not forthcoming for software that also became more complex but less reliable.
As computers became physically smaller, it was more and more feasible to embed them within the systems that they controlled. In 1971, Intel announced the rst complete microprocessor on a single chip, little realising what an enormous impact such a n i d e a w ould have on the world of computing. At the beginning of the 1980s, embedded software had still not really been considered seriously by theoretical computer science researchers (but see 134] ), despite the fact that it is capable of in icting physical damage 13] . However in the last decade, such systems have come under more and more scrutiny as computers pervade all areas of our lives, especially in embedded applications.
The software currently used in computers has itself become so complex that it is not trustworthy and has caused human injury and death as a result 90]. Up until relatively recently it has not been considered feasible to use formal techniques to verify such s o f t ware in an industrial setting 53] . Now that some case studies and examples of real use are available, formal methods are becoming more acceptable in industrial circles. Even populist accounts of the computing industry are mentioning the problems of software errors in relation to critical systems and the possibility of applying mathematical techniques to reduce such errors 62, 94] .
This paper brie y discusses safety-critical systems, examines the use of formal methods as a possible technique for increasing safety and reliability, and surveys some standards in this area. The objective of the paper is to provide information on the current safety issues, particularly with regard to software, as re ected by a n umber of current and emerging standards and to examine ways in which formal methods technology can and has been used to improve system safety. This is a fast moving area in which rapid change is the norm therefore, this paper should be seen as representative snapshot rather than as a comprehensive and de nitive guide. 1 It is also our contention that the subject of software safety and the contribution of formal methods is in its infancy we will, therefore, conclude this paper with a summary of open research questions. A substantial bibliography is included at the end of the paper, with a list of relevant standards, to enable interested readers to investigate the issues further.
Safety-Critical Computer Systems
Safety is closely coupled to the notion of risk. Charette 23] de nes risk as an event or action:
Having a loss associated w i t h i t . Where u n c ertainty or chance is involved. Some choice is also involved.
Safety can then be de ned as the freedom from exposure to danger, or the exemption from hurt, injury or loss. But in most situations, one is concerned with the degree of safety and therefore safety is a subjective measure which m a k es safety provision and measurement extremely di cult and contentious tasks. Safety concerns in computer systems are even more confusing. Such systems consist of many subcomponents which are tightly coupled and have highly complex interactions. The binding of application to operating system to architecture is a prime example of a tightly coupled system. When such a system is further embedded within larger contexts, such as command and control systems, the probability of failure quickly approaches unity. M y ers 88] estimates that there are approximately 3.3 software errors per thousand lines of code in large software systems. This gure is not surprising given that there are as many a s 1 0 20 unique end-to-end paths in a moderate-sized program 117]. What is worse is that not all errors in software are created equal, as small errors do not necessarily have small e ects. The picture becomes much bleaker when the software/hardware interactions in computer systems are taken into account. In two studies 39, 6 3 ] , nearly 10% of all software errors and 35% of all software failures identi ed were later found to be hardware-related, such as transient faults corrupting data. In fact, it appears that hardware can fail three times as often as software under some circumstances 5].
The most e ective means to avoid accidents during a system's operation is to eliminate or reduce dangers during the design and development, not afterwards when the complexity b e c o m e s overwhelming. Safety cannot be considered as an add-on after the system has been developed much the same way that it does not make sense to design an aircraft and then think about its weight. We strongly believe, that safety must be designed in a system and dangers must be designed o u t . W e also feel that software and hardware safety are inextricably intertwined and must be considered as a whole with special attention paid to the interfaces.
Dependable computer systems
Despite these considerable problems, the advantages of the added versatility and exibility p r ovided by digital systems as opposed to other means are overwhelming and, therefore, insuciently understood software and hardware are often used. However implemented, we require that safety-critical systems are dependable. There are many terms associated with dependability, and considerable international e ort has been expended to standardize these 75]. The accepted de nition of the overall concept is 74]:
Dependability is that property of a computing system which allows reliance to be justi ably placed on the service it delivers. The life of a system is perceived by its users as an alternation between proper and improper service. Delivery of proper service (service which adheres to speci ed requirements) is normally termed correctness. Therefore a \correct" system is not necessarily a dependable system. Dependability i s a n o verall property w h i c h has other measures such a s s a f e t y, reliability and availability. Laprie 74] de nes these terms as follows:
Safety is a measure of the continuous delivery of service free from occurrences of catastrophic failures.
Reliability is a measure of the continuous delivery of proper service (where service is delivered according to speci ed conditions) or equivalently of the time to failure.
Availability is a measure of the delivery of proper service with respect to the alternation of proper and improper service.
Formal methods address correctness issues and these will be considered in the remainder of this paper. We do not address other dependability measures here although safety, reliability a n d availability should be modelled and measured independently of veri cation, using probabilistic techniques and testing. However, it is worth pointing out that confusion often arises between the above concepts which are, in fact, distinct. For instance, a safe system is not necessarily reliable (an airplane in ight m a y be safe for only some of the time), a reliable system is not necessarily correct (the autopilot may reliably compute an incorrect course) and a safe system is not necessarily available (the safest airplane is one that never leaves the ground).
The key notion in dependability is that reliance must be justi able 74]. This means that we need explicit and testable requirements and speci cations which are re ned to a system using rigorous or formal development t e c hniques, as well as credible analytical and experimental evidence demonstrating the satisfaction of the requirements by the system. We believe that if no such evidence can be obtained, the wise developer will use human or purely hardware resources instead of software or software/hardware systems.
There are four approaches to achieving system dependability 7 4 ]:
Fault avoidance: How to prevent, by construction, fault occurrence or introduction. Fault tolerance: How t o p r o vide, by redundancy, a service complying with the speci cation in spite of faults.
Fault removal: How to minimize, by v eri cation, the presence of faults. Fault forecasting: How to estimate, by e v aluation, the presence, the creation and the consequences of faults.
It is commonly agreed that a combination of these approaches must be used in order to achieve ultra-high dependability. S o f t ware testing (fault removal) alone may be able to reduce the failure rate of a program to about 10 ;4 per hour (approximately 1 failure per year) and faster more complex computers can only make matters worse. It has been suggested that only an improvement factor of about 10 may b e a c hievable using fault tolerance approaches such a s N -v ersion programming 86]. In fact, the bene ts of these techniques are still a matter of some contention 71]. Combining these gives a gure of around 10 ;5 but most safety-critical situations demand a gure of nearer 10 ;9 or even 10 ;10 (e.g., see FAA82]). This leaves us with an enormous gap between what is desired and what is attainable with current practice. A viable means of narrowing this gap in the future is the use of fault avoidance in the form of formal methods in conjunction with the other techniques. It is particularly fortunate that existing formal methods technology is su ciently developed and well suited for use during the crucial requirements and speci cation stages of development when the system is still relatively abstract and therefore less complex than the nal implementation. Later in this paper, a number of examples of realistically sized uses of formal methods for the veri cation of (parts of) safety-critical systems are brie y outlined and discussed.
Formal methods
Formal methods have been a topic of research for many y ears however they are rarely used in commercial contexts 28]. Whilst industrial research laboratories are investigating formal methods, there are relatively few examples of real use in the computing industry. E v en in companies where formal methods are used, it is normally only to a limited extent and is often resisted (at least initially) by engineers, programmers and managers. This situation is hardly surprising since formal methods technology is largely perceived to consist of a collection of prototype notations and tools which are di cult to use and do not scale up easily there are many widely held misconceptions about the use of formal techniques 48]. Additionally, a proportion of the formal methods research c o m m unity has been inward-looking for much of its existence and has not therefore been able (or willing) to explore ways of working with and improving existing best practice. Even if we knew how to t formal methods with current d e v elopment techniques there is still the problem that a lot of software is currently produced by \ c haotic" processes (as de ned by the Software Engineering Institute's process maturity metrics 60]). The use of formal methods is no substitute for good software production management. Furthermore, the adoption of these techniques requires up-front committal of resources to projects which runs contrary to industrial practice where most projects consume the bulk of their resources toward the end of system development (testing and debugging). Finally, the use of formal methods requires mathematical expertise which is simply not currently available in industry where most practitioners have little or no formal computer science training. In this paper, we will argue that it is possible, and in the case of safety-critical systems highly desirable, to obtain bene ts from formal methods even in constrained contexts.
It is often said that the use of formal techniques in the production of systems should be viewed as a means of delivering enhanced quality rather than establishing correctness. This di erence of perception is crucial and is particularly highlighted in the case of safety-critical systems. Formal methods can deliver correctness { that is adherence to some requirements { and therefore enhanced quality but correctness is not the end of the story.
As pointed out by Cohn 26] , correctness involves two or more models of a system (designer intentions and software/hardware system), where the models bear a tentative but uncheckable and possibly imperfect relation to both the user requirements and the nal implementation. Even under the best possible circumstances, when we h a ve a n a c c u r a t e i n terpretation of the requirements, at best we can assert that the model of the implementation satis es these requirements. Whether the system will work satisfactorily in situ also depends on factors ranging from communication, training, and behaviour to the performance of mechanical, electrical and chemical components both within the system and its operational environment.
Formal methods may b e c haracterized at a number of levels of use and these provide di erent levels of assurance for the software developed by s u c h methods 131]. At a basic level, they may simply be used for speci cation of the system to be designed. The development process itself may be informal, but bene ts are still gained since many bugs can be removed by formalizing and discussing the system at an early stage. Proofs may be undertaken to con rm properties of the system that are required or assumed to be true. Such proofs help to increase the design team's understanding of the system and this is an important component of the increased con dence that such v alidation provides. The Z notation 119] is often used in this manner, and has proved to be bene cial.
The next level of use is to apply formal methods to the development process, using a set of rules or a design calculus that allows stepwise re nement of the speci cation to an executable program. For example, VDM 69] w as speci cally designed for the development of programs, as opposed to just their speci cation or proof in general.
At the most rigorous level, the whole process of proof may b e m e c hanized. Hand proofs or design inevitably lead to human errors occurring for all but the simplest systems. Checking the process by computer reduces the possibility of error, although it never eliminates it since the program that does the checking may itself be incorrect. In addition, it is always possible that the basic underlying axioms may themselves be inconsistent.
Mechanical signi cant improvements will need to be made in their usability before they can be widely accepted in the computing industry. H o wever, proof tools are now becoming commercially available (e.g., the B tool 1] and Lambda 83]). Thus commercial pressures will hopefully improve such tools which u p u n til now h a ve mainly been used in research e n vironments. In particular, the user interface and the control of proofs using strategies or`tactics' are areas that require considerable further research and development e ort. Despite the present inadequacies, safety-critical software is the one application domain where the added con dence of mechanical proofs may be justi able if feasible, even though the development cost of such an approach (of which more later) is high. 78] provides a good snapshot of what is currently available.
Perhaps an indication of the seriousness with which the UK formal methods community n o w takes safety-critical computer systems is that the rst article of the rst volume of the relatively recently introduced journal Formal Aspects of Computing is devoted to this subject 125]. This gives an authoritative, reasoned and balanced account of the state of the safety-critical industry. Many w orkshops speci cally concerned with safety-critical systems and formal methods are now being held (e.g., 30, 32] ). Safety concerns are considered an important part of state-of-the-art software engineering (e.g., 9, 1 2 1 ]) and formal methods promise to help with some aspects of the problems encountered. Safety-related journals also consider how formal methods can help (e.g., 11]). There are now e n tire books on the use of formal methods in safety-critical systems (e.g., 112]), and most more general books at least address the subject (e.g., 79, 1 0 4 ]). 84] i s especially recommended for further reading it includes several case studies using di erent formal notations.
The cost of software safety
Thoreau, in Walden 23] , wrote that: \the cost of a thing is the amount of what I will call life which is required t o b e exchanged for it, immediately or in the long run"
In other words, the cost of safety is determined, ultimately, b y what people are willing to pay. Table 1 70] illustrates the wide range of amounts of money spent on trying to save a h uman life in various situations. Although various methods for calculating the objective cost of safety h a ve been proposed 14, 5 0 ], the problem is largely unresolved. One cannot ever be certain, when an accident does not occur, whether it is because of the safety devices or because the system was designed \well enough" so that the safety devices are super uous. On the other hand, when accidents do occur, the penalties for ignoring software safety can be very severe.
The overall system safety cost includes a multitude of factors and components. From this point on, we will concentrate on the cost of software defects for the producer of the software some of these will a ect safety and others will not. We will attempt to estimate how m uch it costs to Cost per Corrected Defect: $10,500 Table 2 : Software defect cost summary for a typical HP software project.
eliminate software defects at large since the proportion of safety-critical defects to benign ones cannot be quanti ed for all systems. Note that, we d o n o t t a k e i n to account the liability costs incurred by producers of safety-critical software that has failed causing accidents.
Software defect costs can be investigated using a variety o f a p p r o a c hes. Ward 132] uses data focused on the cost per prerelease software defect that is found and xed during the integration through to the release phases of project development. The calculation of the cost is based on the formula Software defect cost = Software defect rework cost + Pro t loss Based on data from an extensive software project database maintained at the Hewlett-Packard Waltham Division for product releases over the past ve y ears, Ward has produced software defect costs for typical software projects as shown in Table 2 . These gures are based on the assumptions that each defect requires 20 engineering hours to nd and x, a cost of $75 per engineering hour and a 1,000 unit customer base of a $20,000 product with a 15% pro t margin. The pro t loss factor is quanti ed using the model of new product development in 106].
The above gures give us an approximation to cost of software defects in projects where current practice is used. We are interested in arriving at a similar cost approximation when fault avoidance techniques, and in particular formal methods, are used. These calculations are based on a substantial railway system 46] which will be deliberated upon further in the next section. If we assume that the system is bespoke, there is no pro t loss associated with late delivery and we will therefore base our calculations solely on engineering hours required to avoid defects. In order to make the comparison with the Hewlett-Packard data meaningful, we assume the same defect density (in other words 1 46 defects per KNCSS). The gures are shown in Table 3 . Although our gures are very rough approximations and they are based on a single set of data, it would appear that the cost per defect avoided is substantially larger than that required for development without formal methods in this case by o ver an order of magnitude.
The high cost may be due to the cost of training, which could be amortized over several projects if formal methods is adopted on a permanent basis. Other substantial industrial examples 55] h a ve demonstrated that formal methods can be the most cost-e ective technology if used in an appropriate manner. Some of these are mentioned later in the paper. In particular, full veri cation may n o t b e w orthwhile in many cases, but may be helpful for the most critical parts of an application formal speci cation alone may be more appropriate for the rest of the system, with rigorous rather than formal development of implementation. Cost per Avoided Defect: $364,000 Table 3 : Software defect avoidance cost summary for a formally veri ed system.
Such con icting evidence on the cost-e ectiveness of formal methods makes the need for proper deployment and quanti cation of the technology even more pressing. It is hoped that an international ongoing study of the industrial applications of formal methods 101] will help shed light on this issue.
Industrial-scale Examples of Use
Whilst safety-critical systems may h a ve the most to gain from the use of formal methods, such techniques are in fact being used in a wide variety of application areas in industry, although still in very few projects overall 6]. Formal methods have been used to improve the quality o f software in a number of non safety-critical areas. They have been shown to have the potential to both reduce the development cost (e.g., the IBM CICS project 59] where a saving of 9% in costs { which runs into millions { has been claimed) and to reduce the time to market (e.g., the inmos T800 transputer oating-point unit 82], where a saving of 12 months development time is claimed).
A notable example of the application of formal methods to a number of related levels of abstraction is provided by the work at CLInc. in Austin, Texas. The Boyer-Moore theorem prover 16] has been used to verify a compiler, assembler, kernel and microprocessor (that has since been fabricated) 85]. Most of these components form a`stack' of veri ed parts that link together to form several related levels in a veri ed system 42]. This is the rst such e ort in the world and although the wo r k i s v ery much based around the Boyer-Moore theorem prover, and thus perhaps di cult to generalize directly, further work in Europe is now building on these foundations along similar lines 10].
It is worth noting that Europe (and in particular the UK) has a leading position in formal methods research and use. These techniques have not gained an equal foothold in North America, even in the safety-critical sector. The notable exception is the security eld where most US formal methods work has concentrated. This work is primarily championed by CLInc, ORA Corporation and SRI International.
Safety-critical systems make up a minority of industrial applications using formal methods 6]. Despite the fact that such systems have the most to gain potentially, industry is wisely cautious in adopting new untried techniques in this area. The following sections give a brief overview of some companies and signi cant projects involved in the development o f s a f e t y-critical systems that have used formal methods over the past few years. In general the results have been successful, but comments concerning individual cases are included below. Table 4 summarizes these experiments. Table 4 : Applications of formal methods to safety-critical systems.
Aviation
An early example of the application of formal methods to real life systems, was the SIFT project, which probably represents the most substantial US experiment in the safety-critical sector. SIFT 135] is an aircraft control computer which w as commissioned by NASA in the mid-seventies. The safety requirements proposed by NASA and the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) are extremely stringent they permit a probability of life-threatening failure of less than 10 ;10 per hour during a ten hour ight F AA82]. Formal methods were used in the SIFT project in order to try and bridge the gap between this failure rate and the 10 ;5 which can be achieved with other techniques such as testing and fault tolerance 86].
SIFT is designed to operate safely in the presence of hardware faults by replication of processors and adaptive m a j o r i t y v oting. In contrast to other majority v oted systems, the voting mechanism that detects and masks hardware faults is implemented entirely in software. It is this software, or rather its design, that was subjected to formal veri cation. The veri cation was conducted in two stages. The rst involved verifying the I/O speci cation against the pre/post speci cation and was done initially using the Boyer-Moore theorem prover 16] and subsequently the STP (Shostack Theorem Prover) system 113]. The second, more substantial proof additionally dealt with the transition speci cation as well as the fault model speci cation. This proof was done using the specially built EHDM system 109] and involved approximately one man year of e ort.
The SIFT system was delivered to the NASA Langley Research C e n ter AIRLAB facility where it has formed the basis for other evaluation projects. It has been found to be a very reliable system but as 86] points out this was the result of the simpli cation of the design rather than the design veri cation exercise (which w as done post code development). This same simpli cation of the system has led to a number of criticisms of the SIFT project it was widely felt that the veri cation exercise involved oversimpli cation which e v entually rendered the system \un t for purpose " 89] . So, although the SIFT episode was a successful research e x e r c i s e i t w as a failure as far as subsequent actual deployment of the processor was concerned.
More recently, NASA commissioned work involving the application of formal methods to support fault tolerance in digital ight c o n trol systems (DFCS). 108] c o n tains the formal specication and veri cation of a model for fault masking and transient recovery in DFCS applications. 110] describes the formal veri cation of the interactive c o n vergence algorithm for Byzantine fault tolerant clock synchronization. 120] discusses the formal veri cation of the FtCayuga fault tolerant microprocessor system. It appears that NASA has found this line of investigation fruitful and or veri cation or both, not whether a method is supported by tools. preferable to experimental quanti cation of software reliability 2 0 ]. Another recent project for the FAA, undertaken by Nancy Leveson et al. has been working to produce a formal speci cation of the TCAS collision avoidance system.
Railway systems
In 1988 GEC Alsthom, MATRA Transport and RATP started working on a computerized signaling system for controlling RER commuter trains in Paris. Their objective w as to increase tra c movement b y 25% while maintaining the safety l e v els of the conventional system. The resulting SACEM system (partly embedded hardware and software) was delivered in 1989 and has since been controlling the speed of all trains on the RER Line A in Paris. The dependability of SACEM has obvious safety implications for 800,000 passengers per day.
The SACEM software consists of 21,000 lines of Modula-2 code. 63% of the code is deemed as safety-critical and has been subjected to formal speci cation and veri cation 46]. The speci cation was done using Abrial's B language 1] and the proofs were done manually using veri cation conditions for the code. The validation e ort for the entire system (including non safety-critical procedures) was of the order of 100 man years and therefore, this experiment represents a substantial investment in formal methods technology.
The authors of 46] b e l i e v e that the system is safer as a result of the formal speci cation and veri cation exercise. It is certainly instructive to observe that even within the current constraints, mature formal methods technology can contribute to system safety. The SACEM work has primarily bene ted from formal speci cation which enabled precise and unambiguous statements about the system to be made. It is interesting to note that a di cult problem which the project team had to resolve w as communication between the veri cation personnel and the signaling experts who were not familiar with the formal notations employed. They overcame this problem by providing the engineers with a natural language description derived manually from the formal speci cation.
Nuclear power plants
Rolls-Royce and Associates have been applying formal methods (mainly VDM) to the development of software for safety-critical systems, and nuclear power stations in particular, for a number of years 54, 5 5 ] . This approach has proved very successful and has produced the following conclusions based on practical experience 55]:
The main problem is the system as a whole, rather than the software alone. A c o m bination of modern techniques, including formal methods, can help in the development o f s a f e t y-critical software, even though their scope may be limited at present. There are many m yths and few facts concerning software engineering methods (see also 48]). 55] lists some myths and facts concerning the use of formal methods in the development of software. Improvements in time-scales, costs and quality are possible in practice using such techniques.
In a (subjective) table giving the contribution of 11 (not necessarily incompatible) software development methods, formal methods is considered the most helpful option. Formal methods are also considered important for the demonstration of software (using animation techniques) and for subsequent c hanges, although structured methods and documentation con guration control are considered more important for the latter. Some approaches, such as the use of independent project teams or the use of diverse software are considered of little or no help.
Tests are still undertaken, but it is noted that these have normally found mistakes in the test software rather than the software under test, since the former has not been developed rigorously, whereas the latter has.
A comparison of cost-e ectiveness of di erent methods has been made (see Table 5 , reproduced from 55]). Using formal methods has doubled the speci cation and analysis stage, but eliminated the redevelopment stage. Since the latter can be of the order of half the costs whereas the former is a much smaller percentage, the overall saving is up to half the cost. One problem which project managers face is that a project using formal methods may b e t wo thirds complete without any sign of the nal software in sight. This can be unnerving the rst time round, and may be one reason for the lack of uptake of formal methods in general unfortunately people have a proclivity t o wards wanting to see some actual running results, even if they are the wrong results! An answer to this problem is to use rapid prototyping tools (perhaps through the use of executable speci cations) for parts of the system that must be demonstrated to the customer before development of the actual software begins.
96] provides an approach to the design, documentation and evaluation of computer-based safety-critical systems that have been used by the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada (AECB) to assess the safety of software in a nuclear power station. Ontario Hydro and AECB are advocating the use of systematic mathematical veri cation techniques and rigorous arguments of correctness 68]. Indeed, they have already applied formal methods in the analysis of the shutdown system for the Darlington Nuclear Reactor plant 3].
Medical systems
A n umber of medical instruments have life critical functionality and require a high degree of dependability. T w o Hewlett-Packard divisions have used formal speci cation in order to enhance the quality of a range of cardiac care products. In both cases the formal notation used was HP-SL 8].
The rst instance 73] i n volves a bedside instrument which is used to monitor vital signs of patients in intensive care units and operating rooms. Formal speci cation was used in a product enhancement i n volving monitoring a segment of the patient's electrocardiogram (ECG) which can be clinically signi cant s i n c e a c hange in that segment can indicate reduced blood ow which can be asymptomatic and hence di cult to detect. The team found that using formal speci cation resulted in higher precision in the development process which helped uncover a number of problems and ambiguities in the informal product speci cation. They believe that the use of formal notation played a signi cant role in realising a high quality product. Although they found it di cult to quantify the bene ts of formal speci cation, they do report improved defect densities as shown in Table 6 (reproduced from 73]). The second example 34] relates to an instrument i n volving approximately 16 Kbytes of safetycritical code in ROM. In this case, the formal speci cation provided a process model of the system, specifying the relationship of inputs and outputs over time. The speci cation was subsequently used to produce SA/SD diagrams (structured analysis/structured design) from which the code was derived. The team again found that using formal speci cation helped them to uncover and resolve a n umber of ambiguities in the informal product de nition. They also found that although they had an increased design time, the e ort paid back in terms of shorter coding times.
It is interesting to note that both teams were particularly concerned with the impact of formal speci cation on their project schedules. Notwithstanding the signi cant bene ts that were realised during development, they felt that adoption of formal techniques would have been very di cult if they had not introduced the approach v ery early on in the project and had they not had managerial commitment and support from the expert HP-SL team in Hewlett-Packard Research Laboratories, Bristol, UK. They found that retrospective speci cation of existing products was problematic and not very successful.
Tektronix in Oregon, USA, are also producing software for safety-critical applications involving medical equipment (as well as developing oscilloscopes) and have started applying formal methods in both areas. Real-time kernels can often be particularly tricky and error prone. Attempts have been made to formalize existing kernels and this has drawn attention to possible problem areas 118]. In particular, it is possible to calculate the preconditions (prior assumptions) of operations and if these are not vacuously true (i.e., the operation can be called at any time) it is possible that an error may be caused by a c t i v ating that part of the software at an inappropriate time. These potential error conditions may not be a problem in the initial release of the software since they never occur in practice howeve r , i f t h e y h a ve been inadequately documented (which is often the case), then subsequent maintenance of the software (quite often by a di erent team) could result in catastrophic failure.
Deaths due to software in medical equipment h a ve been documented elsewhere (e.g., the Therac 25 radiotherapy m a c hine 64, 94, 121] , where the dosage editor was poorly designed) and as a result others are also resorting to formal techniques in this area. 65, 6 6 ] discuss formal speci cation and veri cation issues regarding a clinical cyclotron control system which is currently under development at the University o f W ashington Hospital Cancer Treatment Center.
Ammunition control
The control of operations concerning the storage and use of explosive articles is an area with obvious safety-critical implications. In fact, the Ordnance Board of the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) contributed substantially to the impetus towards the standardization of safety-critical software by articulating the problems inherent in using software in fusing applications such a s torpedoes and missiles. Explosives safety concerns are not however limited to weapons delivery systems. Over the years, the variety of explosive substances and articles has increased signi cantly and the MoD has a continuing problem with the storage of explosives which is driven by t h e increasing complexity and variety o f w eapon systems. Although the MoD does not publish its internal directives, these are known to be consistent with publicly available regulations such a s the United Nations Regulations for the Transport of Dangerous Goods (\Orange Book") UN64]. Similar arrangements operate in other NATO countries.
The ammunition holdings of a number of MoD ranges in the UK are managed by an ammunition control software system (ACS) which has been subjected to extensive v alidation as well as formal speci cation 87]. Although ACS is not a real-time system, it is nonetheless safety-critical since incorrect storage combinations can lead to massive explosions. The ACS software became more safety critical as experienced technical sta were replaced by operators who needed to rely implicitly on the computer output. It is therefore vital that the system correctly implements the appropriate MoD regulations since human intervention is not a feasible backup option.
As an example of what can be done, Mukherjee and Stavridou 87] h a ve produced a formal speci cation of the safety requirements in the Orange book and related it to the operations performed and controlled under ACS in VDM. In particular, they address additions of explosives to magazines and extensions to facilities by means of additional magazines. They have found a number of contradictions in the UN rules. 4 The formal speci cation is signi cant because the MoD can now generate a formal speci cation of their own regulations which when veri ed by t h e regulation authority can be incorporated into the Operational Requirement for a planned ACS replacement in accordance with Def Stan 00{55. Furthermore, the work has demonstrated that the use of formal methods can be successfully extended to areas such as planning and prediction as well as a \change facilitator".
Embedded microprocessors
The Viper (Veri able Integrated Processor for Enhanced Reliability) is a microprocessor that has been speci cally developed for safety-critical applications 33]. The HOL (Higher Order Logic) mechanized theorem prover 43] has been used to verify parts of the processor. However the methods used and the (sometimes misinterpreted) claims about the correctness of this processor have caused some controversy in industrial and even the formal methods communities 17, 2 7 ] .
Viper was the rst \real" microprocessor subjected to formal veri cation and intended for serious use. This fact, coupled with its Ministry of Defence parentage, makes Viper a high pro le hardware veri cation experiment in the UK. In 31], Cullyer outlines the reasons behind the chip's development, namely MoD control of chip design, manufacture and marketing. The constraints on the architecture and manufacture on Viper can be summarized under the heading of \simplicity". This is understandable as simplicity i s a v ery sensible requirement for systems used in safety-critical applications it is also fortunate because in this instance it made formal veri cation experiments possible. Simplicity coupled with the need for quality are potentially fertile ground for the use of formal methods.
In 25, 26], Cohn presents proofs in HOL 43] relating the top speci cation with the host machine (state machine) and the block level description of Viper (register transfer level description). The block l e v el itself, is still very abstract as one has to go through the gate and electronic levels before arriving at the manufactured chip. The proof relating the top level functional speci cation with the host machine revealed a type error, a confused de nition and an incomplete check 25] while the (only partially completed) block l e v el proof did not reveal any problems. Neither proof was of direct concern to the fabricators of Viper chips and indeed, the fact that the rst batch o f chips from one of the manufacturers contained errors cannot be attributed to the aws discovered by Cohn. The chips and the manufacturer literature appeared a long time before the conclusion of the formal veri cation work. It is clearly therefore the case that formal veri cation in the case of Viper was a design quality assurance exercise. The associated costs were prohibitive and therefore the next generation of the chip, Viper2, was not subjected to similar hardware veri cation (although other veri cation techniques have been used 5 ).
The lessons from the Viper experiment can be summarized as follows:
The dependability of the chip was enhanced at a price, although no statistics are available. Formal methods can certainly help deliver slower chips because e cient but complex structures are hard to verify. Although no comparative gures are available, it is di cult to imagine that the formal veri cation produced a cheaper chip. The formal veri cation work was not directly utilized in the development of Viper2 (which is very similar to the original with the addition of a multiply instruction) so there is no evidence of the work aiding design backtracking. The experiment has certainly shown that HOL is scalable even if painfully so 26].
Areas of Application of Formal Methods
As has just been illustrated, formal methods are applicable in a wide variety o f c o n texts to both software and hardware, even within the con nes of safety-critical systems. They are useful at a number of levels of abstraction in the development process ranging from requirements capture, through to speci cation, design, coding, compilation and the underlying digital hardware itself. Some examples of current research w ork in these areas are given in this section. An example of a suggested overall approach to project organization using formal methods is provided by 103]. The Cleanroom approach is another technique that incorporates the use of rigorous methods to produce highly reliable software by means of non execution-based program development 37]. The combination of this approach with the use of formal notations such a s Z w ould be a useful area of study. In 1991 the UK Department o f T rade and Industry (DTI) instituted the`SafeIT' initiative i n order to establish a uni ed approach to the assurance of software-based safety-critical systems by encouraging and nancing collaborative projects in the area 61]. This sponsors industrial (and to a lesser extent academic) organizations to undertake collaborative projects in this area. A second phase of the initiative has been launched in 1992 80 ]. An associated Safety Critical Systems Club has been formed and judging by the attendance of 255 delegates at the inaugural meeting, interest in this area is very strong in the UK. A club newsletter includes articles on the application of mathematical methods to safety-critical systems (e.g., see 2]) as well as issues concerning standards. The research e ort in the area is gathering momentum and a number of interesting projects are currently under way. The SafeIT MORSE and SafeFM projects aim to build models for analyzing safety requirements and nd practical ways of using formal methods in the development of safety-critical systems. The SafeIT initiative is particularly interested in safety standards and has produced a framework for such standards ICSE90].
The European ESPRIT programme is sponsoring two research projects that have a particular interest in the safety of computer-based systems. The ProCoS (Provably Correct Systems) 10] and PDCS (Predictably Dependable Computing Systems) 72] Basic Research Actions are examining di erent approaches to safety, the former concentrating on qualitative and the latter on quantitative aspects.
The upsurge of interest in the area is also evident from the emphasis placed on criticality by major international conferences. The ACM SIGSOFT '91 Conference was devoted to safetycritical software and the 1992 International Conference on Software Engineering is concentrating on trusted systems.
Requirements capture
Accurate requirements capture is very important in the design of any system. A mistake at this stage will be carried through the entire development process and will be very expensive t o c o r r e c t later. Studies have shown that a modi cation in service can cost up to 1,000 times more than a modi cation at the requirements stage 22]. Even worse, two thirds of all errors are made at the requirements stage 22]. So it is hardly surprising that the US Government Accounting O ce has calculated requirements defects cost $6 5 million on 9 projects alone. It clearly makes sense to ensure that the requirements are correct before proceeding with development. When formalizing requirements, there is nothing to validate them against except the real world. Thus it is important that the requirements language is simple enough to be easily understandable, but expressive enough to describe the desired requirements fully. This is a di cult balance to achieve, and the language used will vary from project to project depending on which aspects of the system need to be captured.
There is now a considerable interest in this aspect of design in the formal methods community (see, for example, 41]) it forms, for example, a major goal of both the SafeFM and MORSE projects. For safety-critical systems, timing is often of great importance. This has proved to be a di cult area to formalize in a manner that is usable in practice. However research in this area is gathering momentum (e.g., using the Duration Calculus 139]) 51, 1 0 2 ].
Design
The design process re nes a speci cation down to a program using (possibly) provably correct transformations or some other kind of rigorous re nement method. In general this must involve input from the engineer since there are many programs that meet a particular speci cation. Most formal methods until now h a ve not considered the problem of timing issues in these transformations, partly because of its intractability. H o wever research i s a c t i v e in this area (e.g., 44]). It is crucial to keep things as simple as possible while still addressing the problems that actually matter. In a hard r eal-time system (which includes most safety-critical systems), a missed response is as bad as functional failure, whereas in a soft real-time system the occasional delay in response is tolerable. In the former type of system, it is very important t o p r o ve that the desired response time will be met under all circumstances.
Research i n to real-time formalisms such as Timed CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) 35] is currently very active and is being applied in the area of robotics, for example, to help ensure correctness of the design 99]. Student textbooks for real-time formalisms are also now appearing 81]. However, there are a number competing formalisms to reason about real-time aspects of systems 111] there are many problems yet to be solved and it remains to be seen which o f t h e existing formalisms will be most useful in practice.
Compilation
Compilers produce code that it is notoriously di cult to analyze, particularly as far as timing aspects are concerned. They themselves may be unreliable and introduce an extra unknown into the development process. The development of the compiler needs to be as strictly controlled and reliable as the development of the high-level safety-critical code itself. Thus in the past, software safety standards and directives have normally insisted that all software is written in assembler that can be transliterated almost directly into machine code. However, this simply shifts the burden of responsibility, since the programmer must ensure that the assembler program meets its speci cation, and this is more di cult than the equivalent process for a high-level program.
Nowadays, safety standards are recognizing that programmers can produce high-level programs much more reliably than low-level programs and thus some are even insisting that highlevel languages are used, a complete reversal of the previous guidance issued to engineers. Recent research has demonstrated that it is possible to verify compiling speci cations elegantly and even produce a rapid prototype compiler that is very close to the original speci cation in the form of a logic program 58]. Other related research i s i n vestigating methods to verify an actual compiler, including the bootstrap process, but signi cant barriers remain before such an approach can become viable in practice 128].
Since the machine code itself is the nal program that actually matters, decompilation is sometimes used to ensure that it is correct. Decompilation can be tricky, but very similar (or even identical) programs for compilation and decompilation can be used if a declarative approach is adopted 15].
Programmable hardware
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are often used in process control and work has been undertaken to formalise the design process for these devices 47]. Another relatively new digital hardware technology, which m a y b e o f i n terest to safety-critical engineers who currently use embedded computer systems, is the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA, e.g., 137]). This allows the possibility of directly programming hardware almost as easily as general purpose computers are programmed today. A memory within the FPGA contains a pattern of bits (similar to the object code of a program) that determines the interconnections of a number of digital components such as boolean gates and latches within the chip.
Compilers from high-level programming languages down to a`netlist' of components are now being produced 93], and it seems a realistic goal that such compilers could be formally proved correct. A particularly attractive feature of this direct implementation in hardware for safety-critical systems is that the timing aspects of the program can be considerably simpli ed if synchronous circuits are used. For example, in 93] all assignment statements take one clock cycle and (perhaps surprisingly) all control statements take n o c l o c k cycles since the control operates between the clock edges. Additionally, the natural parallelism of hardware can be used to great advantage. Parallel programs can run truly concurrently and parallel assignments of several variables (up to the entire state of the program) still only take one clock cycle.
This looks like a v ery promising research area for the 1990s and it is foreseen that programmable hardware will be used increasingly during the coming years. Formal veri cation of the overall system will be simpli ed since the high-level program is related directly to gate-level hardware without the complexity o f a n i n termediate instruction set.
Documentation
An important part of a designed system is its documentation, particularly if subsequent c hanges are made. Formalizing the documentation leads to less ambiguity and thus less likelihood of errors. In the case of safety-critical systems, timing issues become signi cant and methods for documenting these are especially important 97].
Formal methods provide a precise and unambiguous way of recording expected/delivered system functionality and can therefore be used as a powerful documentation aid. The normal expectation would be that the system documentation contains both the requirements and the system speci cation in a suitable formal notation, accompanied where appropriate with English narrative. The latter is particularly important for conveying information on system aspects which are not formally speci ed for various reasons.
Human-Computer Interface
The human-computer interface (HCI) is an important p a r t o f m o s t s o f t ware systems. In safetycritical systems, it becomes ever more important that the interface is both dependable 19] a n d ergonomically sound. 6 Formalizing HCI in a realistic and useful manner is a di cult task since the problem has widely divergent facets such as task allocation and cognition, but progress is being made in categorizing features of interfaces that may help to ensure their reliability i n t h e future. However, as it is recognized by the technical workplan of the second phase of the UK SafeIT research programme 80], there seems to be considerable scope for work in this area. Investigation of human errors 105] a n d h o w computers can help to avoid them is now being undertaken in a formal context 52].
Object-oriented Methods
Object-oriented approaches to software development h a ve been advocated as a way to improve the design and reusability o f s o f t ware components, and hence increase their reliability. Recently there has been much discussion on combining object-oriented and formal methods, especially in critical applications 36]. Much research w ork has been undertaken in extending formal notations such as Z and VDM to include object-oriented concepts (e.g., see 122]). Currently there are many v ariants, and it remains to be seen which i f a n y will emerge to be used in practice.
Arti cial Intelligence
Despite the complexities and di culty of understanding the exact nature of AI, there is interest in including arti cial intelligence in safety-critical systems. In particular, blackboard systems are 6 Witness, for example, the HCI issues surrounding the y-by-wire A320 Airbus. Some pilots have consistently criticized the ergonomics of the cockpit instrument l a yout which they have identi ed as a possible contributing factor to the pilot errors which h a ve caused at least 2 crashes so far. being used as a method of communication within AI systems, for example in the area of robotics 99]. Blackboard systems have previously been rather vaguely described, but this problem is now being recognized and an attempt to formalize them has been undertaken 29]. The formal veri cation of AI software is further discussed in 107, 1 3 0 ].
Static Analysis
Static analysis techniques and tools such as MALPAS and SPADE are used in industry for the rigorous checking of program code. Such t e c hniques are sometimes used for post hoc validation of (safety-critical) code. It is a matter of engineering judgement a s t o h o w m uch e ort should be expended to design the system correctly in the rst place and how m uch c hecking should be undertaken after the design has been implemented. The identi cation and the discharging of proof obligatations are two phases of the design process 24].
Safety Standards
There are a wide variety of standards bodies { perhaps too many 7 { throughout the world concerned with software development. The IED/SERC funded SMARTIE project is investigating a standards assessment framework 38] and 49] g i v es an overview of existing standards. Many have emerged or are currently emerging in the area of software safety, because this is now of such widespread importance and public concern. Formal methods are being increasingly mentioned in such standards as a possible method of improving dependability. This section gives some examples of such standards.
In addition, formal methods are themselves being standardized (e.g., LOTOS ISO89], VDM BSI90] and Z ZIP91]). Formal notations are also becoming increasingly accepted in standards as it is realized that many existing standards using informal natural language descriptions alone (e.g., for programming language semantics) are ambiguous and can easily be (and often are) misinterpreted.
An important trigger for the exploitation of research i n to formal methods could be the interest of regulatory bodies or standardization committees (e.g., the International Electrotechnical Commission IEC91, IEC92], the European Space A gency ESA91], and the UK Health and Safety Executive HSE87a, HSE87b]). Many emerging standards are at the discussion stage (e.g., RIA91, IEEE91]). A major impetus has already been provided in the UK by p r o m ulgation of the Ministry of Defence interim standard 00-55 MoD91a], which mandates the use of formal methods and languages with sound formal semantics.
It is important that standards should not be prescriptive. Dependability goals should be set and the onus should be on the software supplier to ensure that the methods used achieve t h e required level of con dence. If particular methods are recommended or mandated, it is possible for the supplier to assume that the method will produce the desired results and blame the standards body if it does not. This reduces the responsibility and accountability of the supplier and may also result in a decrease of safety. Table 7 : Summary of software-related standards.
Formal methods in standards
Up until relatively recently there have been few standards concerned speci cally with software in safety-critical systems. Often software quality standards such as the ISO9000 series have been used instead since these were the nearest relevant guidelines. Now a spate of standards in this area have been or are about to be issued. 115] g i v es a good overview (in 1989) and also covers a n umber of formalisms such as VDM, Z and OBJ. Many standards do not mention a formal approach speci cally (e.g., MIL-STD-882B DoD84]) although most are periodically updated to incorporate recent ideas (e.g., a draft version of MIL-STD-882C is currently under discussion). The software engineering community became acutely aware of the introduction of formal methods in standards in the late 80s and particularly since the introduction of the UK MoD DefStan 00{55 which will be commented upon later in this section. Although, the debate on the exact formal methods content of standards like 00{55 is bound to continue, we feel that there are certain aspects such as formal speci cation which cannot sensibly be ignored by standardizing bodies.
This section introduces the recommendations concerning the use of formal methods in a number of software safety standards. The selection, which is summarized in Table 7 , is somewhat eclectic, but demonstrates the range of areas and organizational bodies that are involved. An overview of current standards concerned with software safety and with an American slant i s provided by 136].
The US and Europe are the major sources of software safety standards and research in this area. In Canada, OH90, AECB91] h a ve been produced in relation to the nuclear industry. Standards Australia is recommending adoption of the IEC Draft Document 65A IEC91]. Interestingly, or perhaps inevitably, information on activity in this area in Japan seems to be hard to obtain. A Japanese angle of software engineering issues is provided by 92]. 7] surveys the situation in Britain.
RTCA DO-178
The US Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) produced a guideline on software considerations in airborne systems and equipment certi cation (DO-178A) in 1985 RTCA85]. This does not explicitly recognize formal methods as part of accepted practice. However a new guideline (DO-178B) is currently under consideration by a committee and is likely to include a brief section on Guidelines for the Use of Formal Methods.
UK HSE
The UK Health and Safety Executive issued an introductory guide HSE87a] and some general technical guidelines HSE87b] concerning Programmable Electronic Systems (PES) in safety related applications in 1987. Two pages are devoted to software development (pp. 31{32) and a further two to software change procedures (pp. 32{33). No mention is made of formal methods it simply states that software should be of high quality, w ell documented, match its speci cation and be maintainable. It does list the necessary phases of software development and includes in these requirements speci cation, software speci cation, design, coding and testing, and system testing. It goes on to state that modi cations to the software should be strictly controlled.
IEC
The International Electrotechnical Commission has issued two standards in the area of safetycritical system development IEC91, IEC92]. These documents were originally issued in 1989, but have recently been updated and reissued. The former deals speci cally with software for computers in the application of industrial safety related systems, while the latter is concerned with the functional safety of programmable electronic systems in general. These are generic international standards designed to be applied in many di erent industrial sectors. An example of a particular instantiation of the IEC65-WG9 standard is included below.
The 
ESA
The European Space A gency has issued guidelines for software engineering standards ESA91]. This suggests that formal notations such as Z or VDM should be used for specifying software requirements in safety-critical systems (p. . A natural language description should accompany the formal text. A short section on formal proof (p. suggests that proof of the correctness of the software should be attempted if practicable. Because of the possibility o f h uman error, proofs should be checked independently. Methods such as formal proof should always be tried before testing is undertaken.
UK RIA
The Railway Industry Association consisting of a number of interested organizations and industrial companies in the UK have produced a consultative document o n s a f e t y-related software for railway signaling RIA91]. It is a draft proposal for an industry speci c standard that has yet to be rati ed. It makes extensive reference to the IEC65-WG9 standard IEC91]. Formal methods are mentioned brie y in several places in the document. Rigorous correctness argument i s a d v ocated as a less detailed and formal proof method to demonstrate the correctness of a program by simply outlining the main steps of the proof. In general, formal techniques are only recommended or mandated when the very highest levels of safety are required.
MoD 00-55 and 00-56
The UK Ministry of Defence have r e c e n tly published two i n terim standards concerning safety. 00-55, on the procurement o f s a f e t y-critical software in defence equipment MoD91a] is split into two parts, on requirements and guidance. The 00-56 standard is concerned with hazard analysis and safety classi cation of the computer and programmable electronic system elements of defence equipment MoD91b]. These standards, and particularly 00-55, mention and mandate formal methods extensively and have, therefore, created many ripples in the defence software industry as well as the software engineering community in the UK. 8 The standards are currently in interim form. The MoD which had previously set 1995 as the goal date for the introduction of fully mandatory standards 18], has now w i t h d r a wn a speci c introduction date. 00-55 mandates the expression of safety-critical module speci cations in a formal language notation. Such speci cations must be analyzed to establish their consistency and completeness in respect of all potentially hazardous data and control ow domains. A further fundamental requirement is that all safety-critical software must be subject to validation and veri cation to establish that it complies with its formal speci cation over its operating domain. This involves static and dynamic analysis as well as formal proofs and informal but rigorous arguments of correctness.
AECB, Canada
The Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) in Canada have commissioned a proposed standard for software for computers in the safety systems of nuclear power stations AECB91]. This has been prepared by D a vid Parnas who is well known in the elds of both software safety and formal methods. The standard formalizes the notions of the environment (`nature'), the behavioural system requirements, and their feasibility with respect to the environment. It is based on the IEC Standard 880 IEC86]. AECB have not, at the time of writing, decided to adopt Parnas's proposal and discussions are continuing.
IEEE P1228
The P1228 Software Safety Plans Working Group, under the Software Engineering Standards Subcommittee of the IEEE Computer Society, is preparing a standard for software safety plans. This is an unapproved draft that is subject to change. The appendix of IEEE91] includes headings of \Formal/Informal Proofs" and \Mathematical Speci cation Veri cation" under techniques being discussed for inclusion. The latest version of the draft (Draft G of January 1992) omits all mention of formal methods so it is unclear what the nal position will be.
Education and certi cation
Safety-critical software is still either not mentioned at all, or mentioned in passing as being too specialized for inclusion, in many standard text books on software engineering, although formal methods are being included more now (e.g., see 116]). 45] bemoans the lack of mathematical content i n m a n y s o f t ware engineering courses.
It is a paradox of current a vionics practice that the engineer who xes bolts on airframes must be accredited whereas the programmer who writes the autopilot software needs no such quali cation. 100] discusses the accreditation of software engineers by professional institutions. It is suggested that training is as important as experience in that both are necessary. In addition, (software) engineers should be responsible for their mistakes if they occur through negligence rather than genuine error. Safety-critical software is identi ed as an area of utmost importance where such ideas should be applied rst because of the possible gravity of errors if they do occur.
Currently a major barrier to the acceptance of formal methods is the fact that many engineers and programmers do not have the appropriate training to make use of them and many managers do not know when and how they may be applied. This is gradually being alleviated as the necessary mathematics (typically set theory and predicate calculus) is being taught increasingly in computing science curricula. It appears that Europe is leading the US and the rest of the world in this particular eld, so this may be a good sign for the long term development and reliability of safety-critical software in Europe 124] . Educational concerns in the UK are re ected in the SafeIT strategy document 61]. The UK Department o f T rade and Industry has commissioned a special study to stimulate the development of education and training in the area. In addition, the British Computer Society and the IEE have established working groups which are aiming to produce proposals on the content o f c o u r s e s a i m e d a t s a f e t y-critical systems engineers.
Some standards and draft standards are now recognizing the problems and recommending that appropriate personnel should be used on safety-critical projects. There are suggestions that some sort of certi cation of developers should be introduced. This is still an active topic of discussion 91], but there are possible drawbacks as well as bene ts by i n troducing such a`closed shop' since suitable able engineers may be inappropriately excluded (and vice versa).
The education/accreditation debate has been particularly active in the UK, in the wake o f Def Stan 00-55. The MoD, having commissioned a report on training and education to support 00- 55 138] , has chosen to withdraw from the consequent c o n troversy stating that it is beyond the remit of the standard to set a national training agenda. Perhaps the central issue here is not formal methods education per se, but the identity of the whole software engineering profession in other words, what precisely is a software engineer is a question that will no doubt be debated for some time to come. 9 6 Discussion and the Future
The subject of software safety has profound technical, business, professional and personal aspects for the individuals who research, develop, sell, use and rely upon computer controlled systems. So it is hardly surprising that the introduction and use of a technology such as formal methods in this context is accompanied by vigorous if not heated debate. What is at stake ranges from substantial industrial investment, to`closed shop' interests and professional pride in the job, and ultimately to our very lives. The arguments surrounding the value and use of formal methods for safety-critical systems are a prime example of the potential for controversy. 10 The complexity of critical systems is rising as more and more functionality i s p r o vided by software solutions. The gap between the dependability requirement s a n d w h a t w e can achieve i n terms of delivering and measuring such dependability i s h uge. We b e l i e v e that, on the evidence of past experiments, formal methods technology deployed in conjunction with other techniques can help narrow this gap. The factors that diminish the e ectiveness of formal methods in this context are: Some aspects of the technology, such as formal speci cation, have been widely used and are relatively well understood. Other practices, however, such a s m a c hine-supported theorem proving, have not bene ted from real-world use and are correspondingly less well developed. Formal methods are expensive when compared with traditional defect removal techniques. It is naive to assume that \money is no object" given that the cost of safety is highly subjective, varies from system to system even within the same sector and depends on the perception and the politics of risk. 11 Clearly the cost-e ectiveness of formal methods will need to be established on a case by case basis. Although it is accepted that the use of formal methods increases dependability margins, we cannot measure by h o w m uch. In fact, even if we c o u l d , w e w ould not be able to measure global dependability since we do not know h o w t o c o m bine formal methods assurance with metrics collected from other techniques such as fault tolerance.
In spite of these problems, we feel that mature formal methods can and should be used to produce safer software because bene ts can be obtained without wholesale adoption. The mere act of writing a formal speci cation, for instance, can help to clarify system design and requirements it can be used to improve or simplify a design it can even be used to produce a rapid prototype in order to evaluate the projected system behaviour. However, in the context of safety-critical systems, it is profoundly important to recognize the limitations of any t e c hnology. F ormal methods cannot do much, for example, in a chaotic software production environment.
If the issues surrounding the applicability of formal methods to critical systems are so complicated, it is hardly surprising that educational provision and standardization are equally complex matters. Currently, there is no universally agreed curriculum for safety critical software professionals. On the contrary, there is a plethora of standards and this domain is beginning to look surprisingly similar to the state of the art in formal methods too many standards that are not industrially used and assessed.
In this paper, we h a ve tried to present an objective account of the state of the art of formal methods as re ected by recent industrial practice and standardization activities. In our opinion, the areas that need to be addressed in the future are research, technology, education/accreditation and standardization for the use of formal methods in the development o f s a f e t y-critical software.
Formal methods research
Research in formal methods to date has largely addressed the functional and/or temporal correctness of system. We believe that as well as continuing to strive for better formal models 56] there is a need to interface formal models with safety engineering techniques such as hazard analysis and risk engineering. We also believe that research needs to focus more on safety-critical system issues which w e collectively call provable dependability. This viewpoint a ords many research dimensions, including amongst others:
Dependability requirements analysis/capture. Integrity, reliability, security, safety, f u n ctional behaviour, temporal behaviour. Dependability speci cation. Can dependability requirements be formally stated? Is it possible to develop problem speci c calculi for the di erent aspects of dependability ( s u c h as fault tolerance and security)? Development of dependable systems. Can we d e v elop the necessary theories for re nement/transformation? If not, how should high integrity systems be built? Machine aided formal veri cation of dependability properties. To what extend can we use theorem proving tools for verifying the dependability properties of systems? Which existing technologies are relevant? Qualitative and quantitative analysis of the dependability that can be achieved using the combination of formal veri cation and fault tolerance. Can we increase con dence in systems by combining assurance methods? Case studies drawn from a wide spectrum of high integrity systems. Real-time embedded systems, distributed systems, high integrity transaction processing systems, theorem proving systems.
Formal methods technology
Formal methods research is abundant, although we b e l i e v e that a focusing on safety-critical systems is bene cial and important. However, and despite the cases of industrial use of formal methods for critical systems that we h a ve discussed in this paper, the technology of formal methods is less well developed. In order to strengthen the technology and contribute to its maturity, t h e following are desirable:
An engineering approach to formal speci cation and veri cation. Better tools. Investment in technology transfer. Uni cation and harmonization of the engineering practices involved in building safetycritical systems. More practical experience of the industrial use of the methods. Assessment and measurement of the e ectiveness of formal methods.
Education and accreditation
The educational debate is also set to continue. It is likely that there will be a skills shortage in this area for the foreseeable future, although most computer science degree programs now contain at least elements of discrete mathematics and formal methods. The contentious issue is the education of the safety-critical software professional work in this area is currently undertaken by the professional institutions and learned societies. Although, even for those of us teaching in higher education there is no established consensus on this issue, it seems to us that software engineering education must be widened with safety engineering and dependability issues at the very least. The most fundamental question that has to be answered is whether the professionals writing the safety-critical software of the future should have a software or hardware or systems education. It is precisely the multidisciplinary nature of most safety-critical systems that makes educational provision such a thorny issue.
A closely related issue is the accreditation of such professionals. In our view, future accreditation is inevitable because of the massive s t a k es in resources and human lives involved in safety critical systems. Happily, the professional institutions are actively examining this issue in conjunction with the educational requirements. Although the outcome of these deliberations is uncertain, any reasonable accreditation procedure can hardly fail to take i n to account a combination of educational quali cations coupled with training and responsible experience requirements.
Standards
The role of standards for safety related software has critical implications for all the aspects that we h a ve discussed above. Witness the impact of the MoD Def Stan 00-55 both in terms of research and development, and education in the United Kingdom 126, 1 2 7 ] . The current level of standardization activity is encouraging. We note, however, that the proliferation of standards is not in itself su cient to ensure the production of safer software. These standards need to be used and their impact on software safety assessed and quanti ed. Moreover, research is needed in order to establish precisely what standards should contain and how v arious sector speci c standards interact when they are used simultaneously on a system. Work in this direction is reported in 38].
Standards have the dual e ect of re ecting current best practice and normalizing procedures to the highest commonly acceptable denominator. As such, a signi cant n umber of software safety standards (at least half in this study) re ect the importance and relative maturity o f formal methods. We believe that this trend is set to continue and standards will increasingly provide more motivation for the research, teaching and use of formal methods. We hope that this will eventually lead to some improvement in the safety of people and resources that depend upon computer software.
